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vRecent decades have witnessed a remarkable resurgence of interest in the phi-
losophy of J. G. Fichte (1762–1814). Long misportrayed as a merely transi-
tional figure propounding a simplistic subjectivism, Fichte now is increasingly 
acknowledged as a major philosophical innovator and a highly sophisticated 
thinker, whose challenging work richly repays careful study. At the same time, 
however, by comparison with the work of the other major German Idealists 
(Kant, Schelling, Hegel, Schopenhauer), Fichte’s own output remains rela-
tively little-known and largely inaccessible to nonspecialists. This is unfortu-
nate, because, even today, Kantian ideas and approaches continue to shape the 
philosophical landscape, and Fichte is the first, albeit the least famous, of the 
truly great post-Kantian philosophers. There therefore is a need for scholarly 
work on Fichte that, in addition to advancing various expert-level discussions, 
will simultaneously offer a solid (and not oversimplified) introduction and 
orientation to Fichte’s philosophy as a whole.
The Palgrave Fichte Handbook is designed to help meet this need in a num-
ber of ways. First, the volume is principally organized according to the basic 
branches of philosophy (thus not according to specific works or periods in 
Fichte’s career, or thematic niches within classical German philosophy—fairly 
standard approaches in the existing literature). Second, there is a strong com-
parative focus throughout the book, with particular emphasis on the compli-
cated relationships between Fichte’s philosophy and Kant’s. Schelling and 
Hegel make repeat appearances also, as do various representatives of existen-
tialism, phenomenology, political theory, analytic philosophy, and so forth, so 
that Fichte’s philosophy is put forward with reference to its conceptual and 
historical context and impact. Finally, the book features a detailed introduc-
tion which offers a basic overview of Fichte’s philosophy, integrated within 
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which are brief treatments of the various more-specialized topics and prob-
lems that the subsequent chapters explore in depth.
Each of the book’s twenty-plus chapters combines helpful exposition, care-
ful interpretation, and incisive argument. All are new essays by leading and 
emerging scholars of Fichte and German Idealism, including some of the 
most accomplished people currently working in the field. Thanks to each con-
tributor’s adept and illuminating work with highly challenging material, The 
Palgrave Fichte Handbook is both an outstanding introduction to Fichte’s phi-
losophy and a major contribution to Fichte scholarship.
Harrisonburg, VA Steven Hoeltzel
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The era of German Idealism stands alongside ancient Greece and the French 
Enlightenment as one of the most fruitful and influential periods in the his-
tory of philosophy. Beginning with the publication of Kant’s Critique of Pure 
Reason in 1781 and ending about ten years after Hegel’s death in 1831, the 
period of “classical German philosophy” transformed whole fields of philo-
sophical endeavour. The intellectual energy of this movement is still very 
much alive in contemporary philosophy; the philosophers of that period con-
tinue to inform our thinking and spark debates of interpretation. After a 
period of neglect as a result of the early analytic philosophers’ rejection of 
idealism, interest in the field has grown exponentially in recent years. Indeed, 
the study of German Idealism has perhaps never been more active in the 
English-speaking world than it is today. Many books appear every year that 
offer historical/interpretive approaches to understanding the work of the 
German Idealists, and many others adopt and develop their insights and apply 
them to contemporary issues in epistemology, metaphysics, ethics, politics, 
and aesthetics, among other fields. In addition, a number of international 
journals are devoted to idealism as a whole and to specific idealist philoso-
phers, and journals in both the history of philosophy and contemporary phi-
losophies have regular contributions on the German Idealists. In numerous 
countries, there are regular conferences and study groups run by philosophical 
associations that focus on this period and its key figures, especially Kant, 
Fichte, Schelling, Hegel, and Schopenhauer. As part of this growing discus-
sion, the volumes in the Palgrave Handbooks in German Idealism series are 
designed to provide overviews of the major figures and movements in German 
Idealism, with a breadth and depth of coverage that distinguishes them from 
other anthologies. Chapters have been specially commissioned for this series, 
Series Editor’s Preface
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and they are written by established and emerging scholars from throughout 
the world. Contributors not only provide overviews of their subject matter 
but also explore the cutting edge of the field by advancing original theses. 
Some authors develop or revise positions that they have taken in their other 
publications, and some take novel approaches that challenge existing para-
digms. The Palgrave Handbooks in German Idealism thus give students a natu-
ral starting point from which to begin their study of German Idealism, and 
they serve as a resource for advanced scholars to engage in meaningful discus-
sions about the movement’s philosophical and historical importance. In short, 
the Palgrave Handbooks in German Idealism have comprehensiveness, accessi-
bility, depth, and philosophical rigor as their overriding goals. These are chal-
lenging aims, to be sure, especially when held simultaneously, but that is the 
task that the excellent scholars who are editing and contributing to these vol-
umes have set for themselves.
Ellensburg, WA Matthew C. Altman 
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Fichte on Property Rights and Coercion
Nedim Nomer
Commentators on Fichte’s social and political writings disagree on, among 
other things, certain elementary aspects of his theory of right. One such dis-
agreement concerns the content of what Fichte takes to be the most basic of 
persons’ rights: the right to property. For some scholars, Fichte defines this 
right in terms of exclusive individual ownership of bits of the material world, 
in line with his stipulation that the subjection of a part of the sensible world 
to one’s own ends is necessary for free agency.1 Other scholars, by contrast, 
argue that free agency, on Fichte’s account, entails above all acting on self- 
given ends or norms rather than possession of material things; thus, a prop-
erty right on Fichte’s account is best understood as the right to labor under 
conditions that ensure one’s subsistence as a free being.2 Another disagree-
ment involves Fichte’s account of the possibility of a society in which persons 
can enjoy property rights. Some scholars argue that such a society emerges 
from a social contract that is freely negotiated and agreed upon by all the par-
ties.3 Others claim that, in Fichte’s view, persons would not freely choose to 
respect one another’s rights; so the possibility of the rightful coexistence of 
persons in a society is contingent upon the existence of an omnipotent state 
that uses coercion to ensure compliance with the principles of right.4
In this chapter I argue that these disagreements stem from partial represen-
tations of Fichte’s ideas, since a cohesive analysis of these ideas reveals that 
Fichte himself does not see any necessary conflict between different types of 
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property right, or between freedom and coercion. For Fichte, all property 
rights are “grounded in” the concept of a “sphere” of the sensible world known 
to a person, which is and remains “subject to” that person’s ends, and which 
may not be “disturbed” by any other person (FNR 183 [GA I/4:20]; GA 
II/13:221).5 Note that this concept of a personal sphere of freedom provides 
no information about the makeup of the sensible world in which such free-
dom can be enjoyed; nor does this concept specify what it means to subject 
such a sphere to one’s own ends. This is because, I suggest, Fichte realizes that 
these questions have different answers in different social contexts (CCS 130 
[GA I/7:85–86]). That is, he recognizes that while having a sphere of freedom 
in one social context may mean being able to enjoy a material object exclu-
sively, in another context it can amount to a license to pursue a specific occu-
pation. In yet other contexts, having such a sphere may also include the right 
to privacy. This means that the concept of a sphere of freedom lends itself to 
several different kinds of property rights without being reducible to any 
one of them.6
Fichte also does not think that coercion rules out freedom. The assumption 
that Fichte believes in this dichotomy leads commentators to differ over the 
question of whether, in his view, compliance with the principles of right is 
voluntary or imposed by a coercive state.7 Contrary to this common assump-
tion, I argue that coercion for Fichte is not only compatible with freedom, but 
also plays a key role in the formation of rightful relations among persons. 
Coercion, for Fichte, is not always a lawful sanction of a state; it may also be 
used by unauthorized individuals for any end they deem necessary. In the lat-
ter sense, coercion is simply the experience of having one’s external freedom 
(i.e., one’s bodily movements) resisted or restricted by another person, or a 
group of persons, without permission (FNR 63–64 [GA I/3:366–67]). In any 
event, Fichte does not believe that coercion makes it impossible for the person 
subjected to it to resist or repulse it; nor, therefore, does it render a person 
unable to exercise choice (FNR, 62–65 [GA I/3:368–71). In fact, Fichte 
believes that the experience of extra-legal coercion, or the likelihood thereof, 
is what ultimately induces persons to will to live by the principles of right 
(FNR 127, 167 [GA I/3:427, I/4:6–7]). The idea here is that coercion among 
persons makes the parties realize that they are all free beings that can always 
think and act in different ways, and therefore that it is possible and best for all 
to live alongside one another without interfering with one another’s freedom 
(FNR 83–84, 128–29 [GA I/3:388, 428–29]).
The question that arises here is: Why does Fichte think that coercion, or 
its likelihood, is necessary for compliance with the norms of right, especially 
 N. Nomer
311
those regarding the definition and distribution of property rights? Why 
doesn’t he suppose, instead, that persons would embrace such norms for 
what they are or purport to be, namely, safeguards of the freedom of all? The 
answer to this question does not lie, as some scholars claim,8 in Fichte’s 
assumption that persons are motivated only by self-interest, since according 
to Fichte there could be selfish reasons to be part of a regime of rights (FNR 
134 [GA I/3:433]). The answer, I suggest, is provided by what Fichte takes 
to be the basic fact of social life, namely that the actions of different indi-
viduals in a social setting always have a tendency to clash, regardless of the 
intentions of the individuals involved. In the first pages of the Foundations of 
Natural Right, Fichte calls attention to this fact by stating that wherever per-
sons come into contact with one another, their “effects” are “capable of influ-
encing, mutually disturbing, and impeding one another” (FNR 9–10 [GA 
I/3:320]). He then makes it the main goal of his theory of right to address 
this fact by showing that it is possible for persons to coexist in peace as free 
beings. Thus, throughout the Foundations and in other writings, Fichte por-
trays the basic function of rights as the resolution of disputes among persons 
about who gets what (FNR 166 [GA I/4:6]; GA I/7:87; GA II/13:221). 
Unless an “equilibrium of right” is established by the parties, Fichte warns, 
such disputes lead to violent conflict, that is, a relentless cycle of mutual 
coercion (FNR 166 [GA I/4:6–7]). In order to reach such an equilibrium, 
the parties need to accommodate one another’s expressed claims to property 
(FNR 117–23, 167 [GA I/3:419–25, I/4:7]). This means that the circum-
stances of disputes or conflicts about who is entitled to what are definitive of 
the property rights that enable the parties, hitherto in conflict, to coexist in 
peace. Hence, Fichte takes coercion, or the threat of it, to be crucial not just 
for the compliance with a regime of property rights but also for the establish-
ment of such a regime.
In line with these points, in what follows I consider Fichtean property 
rights as context-sensitive norms for resolving disputes over who is entitled to 
what that arise among persons in particular social settings, rather than as gen-
eral stipulations about the best way of coordinating the external freedoms of 
persons in any society. First I look at what Fichte has to say about the general 
nature of the right to property. Then I look at the varieties of property rights 
that persons can enjoy in an actual society. Finally I look at the role of coer-
cion, or the likelihood thereof, in the determination of the contents of these 
rights. My analysis draws on the Closed Commercial State (1800), and the 
Doctrine of Right (1812) as well as on the Foundations of Natural Right 
(1796/1797).
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 Property Right in the “Broadest Sense”
In the introduction of the Foundations, Fichte describes property as a “range 
of free actions” that is accorded to a person in a society (FNR 15 [GA 
I/3:327]). He also submits, however, that in order to prevent conflicts among 
those actions, the members of a society must have or reach a common under-
standing on what is rightful property. Hence, Fichte characterizes the “social 
contract” on property rights as the foundation of “civil legislation” (FNR 183 
[GA I/4:20]). It is no accident, then, that he devotes a substantial portion of 
his social and political writings to reflecting on the possible content of the 
social contract on property rights in a rational society. In the Foundations, he 
focuses on, and compares, the property rights mainly of farmers, artisans, 
wage laborers, and merchants (FNR 210–46 [GA I/4:20–48]). In the Closed 
Commercial State he expands on these rights, and suggests further that the 
official functions of civil servants, and the learned pursuits of scholars and fine 
artists, must also be included in the property arrangements of a society (CCS 
113, 193 [GA I/7:74, 136–37]). In the latter book and in the Doctrine of 
Right, Fichte emphasizes the importance of leisure for both the physical well- 
being and the spiritual self-development of human beings, and argues that 
leisure can be treated as a matter of property rights (GA II/13:238–42). And 
in all three books, Fichte often refers to what he calls the “absolute property 
rights” of persons; these are rights that persons enjoy “outside state supervi-
sion,” such as the right to privacy in one’s home, and the right to enjoy as one 
sees fit material objects (such as clothing and valuables) that one purchases 
“with money for one’s private use” (FNR 209–12 [GA I/4:43–46]).
These are some examples of the property rights that are considered in the 
texts indicated. Given the notable differences between these rights, it may 
seem tempting to conclude that Fichte does not have in mind a coherent gen-
eral understanding of the right to property. Yet this conclusion is not war-
ranted, because Fichte believes not only that all property rights have a common 
ground, but also that such rights have some shared qualities. So it is possible 
and meaningful for Fichte to speak of the right to property in its “broadest 
sense” (FNR 168 [GA I/4:8]).
As indicated earlier, all property rights for Fichte are grounded in the con-
cept of a sphere of freedom. For Fichte, this concept provides, and rests on, 
the concept of original right as “a cause in the sensible world and never some-
thing caused” (FNR 103 [GA I/3:404]). The concept of original right is in 
turn “contained in” the concept of personhood, in that the concept of original 
right points to the external conditions for the “continued existence” (sinnliche 
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Selbsterhaltung) of persons (FNR 87, 104, 107–108 [GA I/3:390, 404, 408]). 
By the “continued existence” of a person, Fichte does not mean only the pres-
ervation of the physical body or the satisfaction of one’s primary needs, but 
also the continuation of the ability to set and pursue one’s own ends (FNR 20 
[GA I/3:331]). As he puts it, “We do not regard continued existence as an 
absolute end, but as a means to an end. … All human beings desire life for the 
sake of something; the nobler in order to go on doing, the less noble in order 
to go on enjoying” (FNR 107 [GA I/3:408]). As the external condition of 
such agency, the concept of original right stipulates that each person must 
have a “continuing reciprocal interaction between his body and the sensible 
world” in ways that are “determined and determinable solely by his freely 
constructed concept of such a world” (FNR 107 [GA I/3:408]). For Fichte, 
this is a complex right made up of two rights: (1) the right of every person to 
the “inviolability” of his or her body, and (2) the right of every person to the 
“continued existence of his or her free influence within the entire sensible 
world” (FNR 108 [GA I/3:409]).
To understand the nature of the relation between the concept of original 
right and that of a sphere of freedom, we must consider two further points 
that Fichte makes about the former. The first is that although Fichte sees a 
conceptual difference between the two parts of the original right (namely, the 
right to the inviolability of the body and the right to have free influence in the 
sensible world), he also believes that these two rights are bound together in 
practice. This is simply because a person undertakes an action in the sensible 
world and so makes an impact upon that world either by moving his or her 
body from one physical location to another, or by transferring some material 
object(s) from one location to another, or by doing both simultaneously 
(FNR, 56–57; 103–106; [GA I/3:363–65, 405–408]). Thus, a person can be 
prevented from participating in the sensible world in ways he or she intends 
or plans by confining that person to a site without any means of escape. To be 
able to act freely in the sensible world, therefore, a person needs to have unfet-
tered access to a physical space, and/or to various objects or tools in that 
space. This is not to say that having causality in the sensible world is reducible 
to having access to, and being confined to, a circumscribed geographic loca-
tion. Recall that the concept of original right allows persons to have “influ-
ence within the entire sensible world.” Hence, a person must be free to pursue 
his or her ends wherever and however these ends are attainable. Fichte’s point, 
in any case, remains the same: freedom of action in the sensible world cannot 
be secured without also securing the spatial and material components of such 
freedom. For Fichte this is partly what it means to have a “sphere” of freedom 
in the sensible world (GA I/4:5–6).
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Fichte’s second point concerns the nature of the freedom involved in being 
a “cause in the sensible world.” For Fichte, such freedom does not consist 
simply in pursuing or actualizing a particular end, or a set of ends; it also 
requires that, before taking any action, one must be in a position to choose 
the ends and means of one’s actions from a plurality of alternatives (FNR 33, 
105 [GA I/3:343, 406]). The idea here is that the freedom to “refrain from” 
actions that present themselves as options is part of what it means to be the 
cause of one’s determinations in the sensible world. Fichte therefore submits 
that a person’s sphere of freedom must be defined in terms of “all of the pos-
sible free actions” of that person, and not in terms of the actions that are car-
ried out by that person (FNR 56 [GA I/3:363]). Fichte also takes care to note, 
however, that a person cannot be said to have free causality in the sensible 
world simply by virtue of having some alternatives for action, whatever those 
may be. If the alternatives are imposed or defined by another, then one cannot 
see oneself as the cause of one’s deeds in the sensible world; so, one must have 
control over the nature of the action-alternatives that one has. In Fichte’s 
words, the person must determine “the quality and quantity” of his or her 
activities (FNR 103 [GA I/3:405]). This is another way of saying that the 
person must be able to define the boundaries of the sphere of freedom within 
which he or she acts.
In short: the sphere of freedom is a set of action-possibilities defined by a 
person such that when this person engages in any of these actions, his or her 
related bodily movements in the sensible world are not impeded by others. 
On Fichte’s account, one cannot be or recognize oneself as the cause of one’s 
determinations in the sensible world without enjoying such a sphere of invio-
lability. By the same token, the enjoyment of such a sphere is a necessary 
condition for the continued existence of oneself as a person.
Be that as it may, Fichte declares that the original right to exercise causality 
in the sensible world has “no real meaning” and that no human being has 
original rights, for “there is no condition in which original rights exist” (FNR 
101–102 [GA I/3:403]). Fichte qualifies this declaration by pointing out that 
the original right is only a concept, a theoretical construct, “created for the 
sake of a science of right,” not a determinate legal right that one can claim 
against others in a society. In other words, this concept provides a philosophi-
cal grounding for the rights that persons are to enjoy in actual societies, but 
does not itself function as such a right. For Fichte, this is evidenced by the fact 
that the concept of original right indicates what “in general” belongs to the 
freedom of a person “without considering the necessary limitations imposed 
by the rights of others” (FNR 101 [GA I/3:403]). Also, while this concept 
requires that every person must enjoy a sphere of freedom in the sensible 
 N. Nomer
315
world, it leaves open the question of how far a person’s sphere is to extend. In 
theory, therefore, a person’s sphere of freedom could encompass the “entire 
region of the world known” to that person (FNR 105, 110 [GA I/3:40 412]).
But how can Fichte believe that the concept of original right is suited to 
explaining or justifying the determination of the rights of persons in actual 
societies, while also maintaining that this concept allows each person to lay 
claim as his or her sphere of freedom to the “entire region of the world” 
known to him or her?9 Doesn’t this concept in fact make it impossible for 
persons to coexist in peace within a society, by making collisions among per-
sonal spheres of freedom unavoidable? Fichte is well aware of this dilemma 
that his concept of original right creates, and formulates the problem here as 
follows: If the freedom of a person “were infinite as described above, then the 
freedom of all, except for that of a single individual, would be canceled. Then 
freedom itself, even its physical existence, would be annihilated” (FNR 109 
[GA I/3:411]). According to Fichte, however, this dilemma is not insoluble, 
and the solution lies in realizing that the conflicts among persons about the 
boundaries of their spheres of freedom are (or can be) conducive to, or consti-
tutive of, rightful relations among persons rather than destructive of such 
relations. He makes this point in the passage below:
In order for a contract to be possible, both parties must will to enter into a con-
tract concerning either their already conflicting claims or their claims that might 
possibly conflict in the future; moreover, the two parties must will that each of 
them, for his part, will yield in his claims to the disputed objects until their two 
claims can coexist. If only one of the two, or if neither, wants to enter into a 
contract, then no contract is possible and war will inevitably result. According 
to the law of right, the rational being is required to will to enter into a contract, 
and so there is a right of coercion that can force each person to do so. (Admittedly, 
this right of coercion cannot actually be applied, since it is impossible to deter-
mine how far a person is to yield in his claims.) … Thus the second requirement 
for a contract to take place is that the wills of two parties be united for the purpose 
of peaceably resolving their dispute over rights: since this unity of will determines 
the form of a contract, we shall call it the formally common will. A further 
requirement for the possibility of contract is that both parties limit the private 
wills they initially have to the point where these wills are no longer in conflict. 
… We shall refer to this unity of wills as the materially common will. (FNR 
166–67 [GA I/4:6])
This passage is situated in a section of the Foundations where Fichte explores 
the possibility of “relations of right” in a society. There, his general claim is 
that a social contract concerning property rights is indispensable for both the 
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formation and stability of such relations. In the passage above, Fichte pro-
poses that social contracts are not made in a vacuum; they are needed and 
formed only where there exists, or may exist in the foreseeable future, a “dis-
pute” (Streit) among persons regarding an “object” of common interest. Fichte 
does not specify here the nature of the objects that tend to generate disputes 
among persons. In the lines preceding the above passage, however, he makes 
clear that here he is referring to a dispute that arises among persons because 
each party wills to “possess this or that thing as his property” (FNR 166 [GA 
I/4:6]). That is, this is a dispute about property rights over “things” that can 
be allocated to persons one by one. For Fichte, the prime function of the 
social contract is to resolve such disputes. This means that the Fichtean social 
contract is not a hypothetical agreement among the inhabitants of an imagi-
nary state of nature; rather, it is a mechanism for resolving disputes that arise 
among persons about particular objects in specific social settings. This is a 
point that Fichte makes and emphasizes in all of his writings on right (see also, 
for example, CCS 131 [GA I/7:85]; GA II/13:221).
Fichte suggests here that in order to form a social contract on property 
rights, the parties to a dispute need to attend to two sets of considerations. 
The first set of considerations pertains to the nature of a social order that is 
not organized around a social contract on property rights. In the absence of 
such a contract, nobody could reliably enjoy property rights, since it would be 
uncertain who is entitled to what (FNR 109, 113 [GA I/3:410–11, 414]). 
This being the case, each person would unilaterally lay claim to some part of 
the sensible world and be prepared to use force to protect it from the infringe-
ments of others. In Fichte’s words, each would be prepared to use his or her 
“right of coercion” against others to make them respect his or her “claim” of 
property. On Fichte’s account, the right of coercion is “grounded in” the origi-
nal right to have free causality in the sensible world (FNR 88–89, 109 [GA 
I/3:392, 410]), which means that one is entitled to use coercion when one’s 
original right is either violated or under threat of violation. It is not hard to 
grasp why Fichte believes that in the absence of a social contract on property 
rights, individuals would take themselves to be entitled to use coercion against 
one another, for there would be no public institution to defend anyone’s origi-
nal right to free efficacy. Hence, this would be a social setting that is marked 
either by violent conflicts among persons or by the constant possibility of 
such conflicts. Note that when Fichte here appeals to the original rights of 
persons, he is not referring to the abstract concept of such rights, but to the 
“claims” that persons actually make to “possess something” in an actual soci-
ety. It is equally crucial to realize, however, that there is a parallel between the 
concept of original right and such claims. In Fichte’s view, the claims that 
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persons make to possess something are nothing but expressions of their “will” 
to be able to conduct themselves in the sensible world without being obstructed 
by others (FNR 184 [GA I/4:20–22]). That is, people demand property rights 
in order to engage in “free action in the sensible world,” which amounts to 
property “in the broadest sense of the word” (FNR 168 [GA I/4:8]). The par-
allel between the concept of original right and the claims that people actually 
make to some property is not hard to discern. We have seen that the concept 
of original right relates to the concept of the personal sphere of freedom as an 
end relates to its means: to exercise free causality in the sensible world, one 
needs to enjoy an inviolable sphere of freedom in that world, and this is what 
property rights ensure. It is now clear that the concept of original right is to 
be treated, as I believe Fichte does treat it, as a conceptual representation of 
the claims that persons in actual societies make to the recognition by others of 
their property rights.
For Fichte, a second set of considerations that facilitate the formation of a 
social contract on property rights in a social setting concerns the mentality 
that is involved in the making of such a contract. In the passage cited above, 
Fichte clearly takes the view that the property rights of persons in an actual 
society cannot be derived from the “private wills” of persons, since the private 
will of a person cannot move or bind others. That is why Fichte argues, in the 
passage cited earlier, that unilateral application of the “right of coercion” can-
not settle disputes about property rights. So, a person acquires a right not by 
unilaterally claiming it, but only when others can be obligated to recognize 
that right (FNR 114 [GA I/3:415]). Yet this is possible only if the claimer of 
the right in turn recognizes the similar claims of others. In practice, this means 
that nobody can claim to own the entire sensible world without leaving some 
room for others; otherwise one would find oneself in conflict with every other 
person. So the possibility of establishing enduring relations of right in a social 
setting requires that each “yield in” his property claims to a point where the 
property claims of the parties no longer clash (cf. FNR 115 [GA I/3:416]). To 
achieve that, each must be willing to negotiate with, and make concessions to, 
others. Fichte calls the shared willingness to participate in such negotiations 
“the formally common will” (FNR 167 [GA I/4:6]), since what is required for 
such negotiations to get underway is that each is willing to participate in them 
whatever the outcome may be. Of course, a lasting peace among persons can 
be established only if the parties indeed reach a commonly acceptable defini-
tion and distribution of property rights, which would constitute what Fichte 
calls “the materially common will” (FNR 167 [GA I/4:6]).
So far we have considered how, on Fichte’s account, persons can come to 
enjoy property rights in an actual society. This account has two parts. The first 
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is a portrayal of the concept of original right and its relation to the concept of 
a personal sphere of freedom. I have suggested that the latter specifies the 
condition of the former; that is, the enjoyment of a sphere of freedom makes 
the exercise of free causality in the sensible world possible. I have also argued 
that, for Fichte, the property claims made by persons in actual societies can be 
understood in light of the concept of original right, and thus as demands to 
enjoy an inviolable sphere of freedom in the sensible world. The second part 
of Fichte’s account demonstrates, however, that what ultimately defines the 
property rights of persons is not their private wills to possess such a sphere, 
but, rather, a commonly negotiated resolution of their disputes or conflicts 
about who is entitled to what.
But our analysis so far only addresses Fichte’s general account of the deter-
mination of property rights, without identifying the concrete liberties, objects, 
or amenities which may fall under such rights in actual societies. We must 
now examine Fichte’s remarks on different kinds of property rights, in order 
to assess the extent to which his general theory helps us to understand the 
determination of property rights in actual societies. After all, if Fichte believes 
that, in theory, the disputes among persons about the permissible range of 
freedom in a social setting are key to defining the property rights that can be 
upheld in that setting, he might still concede, as some commentators have 
argued, that in reality such disputes can never be resolved “peaceably” by the 
parties and therefore can be brought to an end only through the use of force 
by the state. Secondly, it is still possible that Fichte subscribes to a particular, 
universally applicable type of property right. That is, although his concept of 
a personal sphere of freedom can lend itself to different definitions of a prop-
erty right, Fichte may still believe, as some commentators have contended, 
that there is only one particular basic way in which the right to property is to 
be defined in actual societies. In the remainder of this chapter, I try to fill in 
these gaps in our reconstruction of Fichte’s account of property rights by con-
sidering what he has to say about property rights in actual societies, and about 
the circumstances of disputes or conflicts that are constitutive of these rights.
 Fichtean Property Rights
Although the concept of an original right to have absolute causality in the 
sensible world is not a specific legal right to be, do, or have something, Fichte 
takes this concept to provide the basis for understanding and justifying the 
property rights of individuals. Textual support for this claim can be found in 
the section of the Foundations devoted to spelling out this concept, where 
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Fichte writes, “There is no separate right of self-preservation; for it is merely 
contingent that, in a particular instance, we happen to be using our body as a 
tool, or things as means, for the end of securing the existence of our body” 
(FNR 108 [GA I/3:409]). The basic message of this statement is that in order 
to secure one’s continued existence as a freely acting body in the sensible 
world, one needs to be free and safe to engage in either of two types of activi-
ties: either to move one’s body from one place to another, or to utilize a mate-
rial thing in so doing. Notice that these two types of activity are accommodated 
by Fichte’s concept of the personal sphere of freedom. Relatedly, the distinc-
tion between these two types of activity provides a framework for defining the 
property rights of persons, since they call attention to two types of right that 
must be accorded to persons in a society insofar as they are regarded as embod-
ied, self-determining beings; these two types of right are (1) the right to cer-
tain kinds of free activity, and (2) the right to use certain material objects. 
Fichte develops this bipartite division of rights into a general catalog in the 
Closed Commercial State:
Our theory posits the first and original property, the basis of all others, in an 
exclusive right to a determinate free activity. This free activity can be determin-
able, and determined, in one of three ways. Either solely through the objects it 
acts upon. This is the case, for example, with the right to undertake whatever one 
may wish in and with a certain area and keep the rest of the human race from 
modifying this area in any way … This area could … be called the property of 
the one who has been granted the right, though strictly speaking his property 
consists solely in his exclusive right to every possible modification of this area. In 
actual life I am not familiar with any example of such an unlimited right to 
property. Or, secondly, this free activity is determined only through itself, only 
through its own form (its kind and manner, its purpose, and so forth), without 
any regard to the object it acts upon: the right to conduct exclusively a certain 
art (to manufacture clothing, shoes and the like for others) and to keep everyone 
else from practicing the same art. Here we have property without possession of 
any kind. Or finally, this free activity is determined by both: through its own 
form and through the object that it acts upon: the right to undertake a specific 
act upon an object, and to exclude all other men from the same use of the same 
object. In this case too, an object can … be called the property of the one who 
has been granted the title of right, although strictly speaking his property con-
sists in only in the exclusive right to a certain free action toward this object. The 
exclusive right of the farmer to cultivate grain on his piece of land is of such a 
kind. (CCS 130 [GA I/7:85–86])
This passage contains the core of what Fichte has to say about property 
right in his principal writings. Remarkably, the general claim he advances in 
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this passage is fully consistent with more recent accounts of property rights. 
This is the claim that a property right does not consist in a “two-place rela-
tion” between a person and an object, which can be an activity, occupation, or 
material thing; rather, a property right in fact defines the nature of the relation 
between the right-holder and others.10 More specifically, the basic function of 
someone’s right to an object, whatever it may be, is to constrain the kinds of 
claims that others are allowed to make over that object. For instance, if some-
one has the right to use a particular material object, this right does not describe 
the isolated relation between this person and the object in question; rather, it 
“excludes” other persons from accessing the object at the same time or in the 
same way. Similarly, if someone has the right to conduct a certain art, such as 
dressmaking, it is not the case that this person may conduct this art regardless 
of what others do; rather, in a Fichtean society, there would be a society-wide 
division of labor whereby some would be entitled to work in a particular pro-
fession, while others are allowed to pursue other types of work so that the 
economically productive activities of different individuals can concur and 
complement one another. It is therefore misleading to suggest that “for Fichte, 
all rights refer to actions, never to things.”11 As Fichte makes clear in the above 
passage, rights can refer to actions, to material things, or to both at the same 
time; what defines a right is not the particular nature of the object of that 
right, but the way in which the right defines the relation between the right- 
holder and others while the right-holder exercises that particular right.
Fichte indicates his reasons for endorsing this particular view of property 
rights in the lines preceding the passage above. There he tries to motivate his 
own view by contrasting it with the ancient doctrine of feudal land tenure, 
according to which a tenure-holder not only is the “only proprietor” of a piece 
of land and everything in it, but also has the sole authority to set the condi-
tions under which other individuals live and work on that land. Fichte rejects 
this doctrine for its “one-sidedness and incompleteness when applied to actual 
life” (CCS 130 [GA I/7:85]). The emphasis here is on “when applied to actual 
life.” That is, Fichte does not think that this doctrine is intrinsically flawed, 
but rather that it allows only a minority of human beings to own land. So, this 
doctrine can hold in “actual life” only on the assumption that the rest of 
humanity will not contest the land tenure rights of the few (CCS 131 [GA 
I/7:87]). In Fichte’s view, this is the assumption that makes this theory “one- 
sided” and “incomplete,” and therefore vulnerable to being rejected in actual 
life by those who are disadvantaged by it, as exemplified by the French 
Revolution.
For Fichte, what distinguishes his view of property rights from the doctrine 
he rejects is that his view does not assume away the constant contestability of 
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any regime of property rights; on the contrary, his view takes as its premise 
that all rights to property are susceptible to the “active expression of the force” 
of those who are disadvantaged by them, or of those who disagree with them 
in principle, and therefore that property rights are sustained only on the con-
dition that conflicts about the “objects in dispute” are resolved in a mutually 
acceptable way (CCS 131 [GA I/7:87]). One result of this view of property 
rights, Fichte points out, is that “there is no property of land” (CCS 130 [GA 
I/7:86]; GA II/13:242). He explains this result in the Foundations as follows: 
“Land is humanity’s common support in the sensible world, the condition of 
humanity’s existence in space and thus of its entire sensible existence,” so it 
must be shared by all (FNR 189–90 [GA I/4:26]). This does not mean, how-
ever, that land can only be held jointly, like streets and parks, or that soil may 
never be the object of individualized property rights. According to Fichte, 
individual exclusive right over land is not impossible; a farmer’s right to culti-
vate a “particular piece of land” and to “exclude” all others in so doing is such 
a right (FNR 190 [GA I/4:26]). Fichte takes care to add, however, that a 
farmer may have this right only on the condition that his particular use of that 
piece of land does not make it impossible for others who also need it for their 
livelihood, such as animal breeders, to use the same piece of land. Notice that 
the rights of farmers and those of animal breeders are only to particular “uses” 
of a piece of land that are compatible with one another; they are not owner-
ship rights as defined by the feudal land tenure regime, which authorizes 
property owners to prevent all others from accessing a piece of land in any 
way. A second, yet related, difference between Fichte’s view of property rights 
and the land tenure regime is that the former, before supporting any actual 
regime of property rights, constrains the “effects” that a person’s enjoyment of 
a particular property right has on others: Fichte’s view does not support pos-
sible or actual exercises of a right that would be detrimental to the freedom of 
others (CCS 131 [GA I/7:87]). For example, a tailor’s exclusive right to pro-
duce and sell clothing to others does not entitle him to withhold distribution 
of products to others so as to cause an “artificial rise” in the price of these 
goods and make a profit at the expense of others (CCS 102 [GA I/7:63]). 
Ultimately, then, Fichte’s view of property rights does not concern itself with 
the nature of the objects of such rights; nor is it important for this view pre-
cisely how a right-holder relates to the object of his or her right; what matters, 
rather, are the “effects” that the right-holder’s use of the object in question has 
on others. That is why in his catalog of property rights Fichte stresses that a 
property right defines the set of actions that a right-holder is allowed to under-
take in a society, whatever the object(s) of that right may be.
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To bring into sharper focus the real-society implications of Fichte’s catalog 
of property rights, let me now consider in some detail some examples from 
each category of rights in that catalog, starting with the last. The last category 
comprises cases of the right to “free activity determined both through its own 
form and through the object that it acts upon.” This is the character of the 
rights of “producers” and “artisans” who make up what Fichte takes to be the 
two pillars of a semi-industrialized commercial society (CCS 95–108 [GA 
I/7:56–70]; FNR 188–206 [GA I/4:24–41]; GA II/13:232–42). Fichte’s 
elaboration of the rights of such individuals, and for that matter all members 
of a society, makes it clear that they are not only right-holders but also bearers 
of certain civic obligations (Verbindlichkeiten). And if they are not willing to 
take on such obligations, they may be coerced to do so (FNR 206 [GA I/4:24]; 
CCS 103 [GA I/7:64]; GA II/13:210–11). Producers, such as agriculturalists 
and animal breeders, have the “exclusive right to extract the products of 
nature” that are essential for the physical sustenance of the whole of society. 
Given the importance of such products, Fichte observes, the members of a 
society would seek the most efficient way of providing them. In a relatively 
large society, this would be the division of labor; thus, only some members of 
the society would be assigned the exclusive task as well as the right to provide 
them, while others would be given other tasks and corresponding rights (CCS 
97 [GA I/7:56–58]). Accordingly, the farmers would have to refrain from 
processing their produce for the purpose of retail, since the latter tasks, namely 
the processing of raw materials and their sale in the relevant markets, will be 
carried out by “producers” and “merchants” respectively. Depending on the 
fertility of the farmed lands and the existing agricultural technologies, the 
farmers must produce enough not only to feed themselves but also all others 
in society (GA II/13:235). Yet when they have done so, they are not allowed 
to keep their surplus produce in storage so as to bring about an artificial 
increase in the price of such goods.
Similar considerations apply to artisans as well. Fichte divides artisans into 
two groups; “those who own the materials on which they work” and “those 
who merely expend their labor but do not own the materials on which they 
work” (FNR 203 [GA I/4:38]). While the members of both groups have the 
same exclusive right to conduct a certain craft, only those in the first group 
have the additional exclusive right to use the tools and raw materials funda-
mental to their trade. Yet artisans in both groups are obligated to remain 
within the bounds of their trade: they may not be involved in the provision of 
raw materials or in the sale of their products, which is the right of merchants. 
Also, they may not refuse to sell their products to merchants in order to arti-
ficially reduce the supply of these goods and so increase their price.
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Let us now turn to the second category of rights in Fichte’s catalog, namely 
rights to a “free activity [which] is determined only through itself without any 
regard to the object it acts upon” (CCS 130 [GA I/7:85–86]). Artisans who 
are licensed to conduct a certain craft exclusively without owning the materi-
als they work with, or produce, have this kind of property right. State officials, 
teachers, and wage laborers are also among the holders of this kind of right. 
The property rights of these individuals refer only to the “actions” they are 
permitted to undertake, not to the material objects they may come into con-
tact with. There is, however, a crucial difference between the groups of right- 
holders just listed. Wage laborers, depending on the nature of their 
employment, can directly contribute to the material sustenance or well-being 
of a society, whereas public officials and teachers are not in a position to do so. 
For an example of such wage laborers, Fichte talks about individuals hired by 
the state to work on mines (FNR 193 [GA I/4:29]). According to Fichte, 
mines are best viewed and treated as common property, since they are pivotal 
for the sustenance of the entire society. Hence, Fichte argues, instead of priva-
tizing mines, the state should take upon itself the task of extracting from them 
by hiring free laborers who are willing to do so. In contrast, the activities of 
public officials or teachers have no relevance for the material subsistence of 
society; the former are responsible for state administration and law enforce-
ment, and the latter contribute to the spiritual development of the members 
of society. There is, however, something in common to the property rights of 
all these individuals—that is, wage laborers, public officials, and teachers: 
they require a certain degree of affluence in society, so that there is enough 
money in circulation to compensate for their rightful activities. That is, to be 
able to pay the salaries of these individuals, the materially productive groups 
in society must be able to generate material resources or values that go well 
beyond what they themselves require to survive and well beyond what the 
society as a whole requires to meet its primary needs (CCS 98 [GA I/7:60]; 
GA II/13:240–42). Therefore, part of the “surplus” resources (Überschuβ) they 
produce, or their monetary value, must be given to the state in the form of 
taxes so that it can pay the salaries of its employees.
This brings us to the first kind of rights in Fichte’s catalog, namely, the kind 
that entitles a person “to undertake whatever one may wish in and with a 
certain area” (CCS 130 [GA I/7:85]). This also requires some degree of public 
as well as private affluence. Fichte quickly points out that he is not aware of 
any example of “such an unlimited right to property.” Still, he sometimes 
thematizes a type of property right that comes close to being an example of 
such rights, namely the right to “absolute property.” Fichte considers the right 
to own a house and the right to privacy in one’s house as instances of the 
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absolute property right (FNR 209–11 [GA I/4:43–46]; GA II/13:264). The 
right to privacy denotes an absence of duties towards others, including the 
state: “The lock on my door is the boundary line between state and private 
authority,” so in one’s house one is “beyond the state’s supervisory authority” 
(FNR 211 [GA I/4:45]). Note that, so defined, privacy is not an exercise- 
concept; rather it indicates a state of immunity from the sight and demands 
of others. For Fichte, one may acquire the right to privacy only after having 
labored (for oneself and for society) and after having paid one’s taxes to the 
state. The reason why Fichte does not consider the absolute right to own a 
house, or to privacy, as examples of the right “to do whatever one may wish in 
and with a certain area” is because there are limits to what one may do even in 
one’s house; for example, one may not kill or assault anyone therein. Also, one 
is not allowed to store marketable goods there in order to artificially raise their 
price in the market.
To fully grasp the nature of a Fichtean regime of property rights, however, 
we need to consider two provisos that for Fichte must be met by any such 
regime. The first is that although most of the activities of right-holders will be 
devoted to providing for the material sustenance of their society and of them-
selves, nobody should be expected to work under duress like a pack animal; 
rather, each should be able to “labor without fear, with pleasure and joy, and 
have time left over to raise his spirit and eye to the heavens” (CCS 110 [GA 
I/7:71]). For Fichte, this is possible when the existing regime of property 
rights supports fair living and working conditions (CCS 99 [GA I/7:60–61]). 
Also, depending on the productivity level of the overall economy, each must 
be able to enjoy some leisure time (GA II/13:230; CCS 106, 114 [GA I/7:68, 
74]). Fichte’s second proviso is that nobody should be unable to make a living 
from the activities that define his or her occupation under a regime of prop-
erty rights (FNR 185 [GA I/4:22–23]). For this would mean that the condi-
tions of this person’s “continued existence” as a free being are not ensured by 
that regime and therefore that this regime “is completely canceled with respect 
to him” (FNR 185 [GA I/4:22]). This person would then be entitled to a 
“repartitioning” of property rights in that society, and would have the “abso-
lute right of coercion” to demand it, because as far as this person is concerned, 
the existing regime of rights would have failed to ensure the peaceful and 
rightful coexistence of persons.
Having considered these examples of Fichtean property rights, one may 
have the impression that the Fichtean regime of such rights is intended for, 
and is applicable only in, a relatively affluent, semi-industrialized, commercial 
society the likes of which were taking shape in Europe at the end of the eigh-
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teenth century, that is, in Fichte’s own time.12 However, if my analysis of 
Fichte’s remarks on property rights so far is accurate, then this impression 
underrates the range of applicability of his remarks. While it may be true that 
Fichte wished to propose an account of property rights that was applicable to 
the social and historical setting in which he lived, it does not follow that this 
is the only setting to which his account can be applied. I have argued that 
Fichte sees property rights as context-sensitive mechanisms for resolving the 
disputes about who is entitled to what that arise in particular social settings. 
That is why, while identifying the property rights that persons are to enjoy in 
a society, he takes care to emphasize the historical and economic contingen-
cies that play a role in defining these rights, such as the fertility of arable lands, 
the existing agricultural technologies, the efficiency and productivity of the 
overall economic system, and so forth. Relatedly, he points out that some of 
the rights that merchants and artisans, for example, enjoy in a relatively afflu-
ent society would not exist in a relatively poor, economically unproductive 
society where a subsistence economy prevails; this would be a society where 
“each man sits alone in front of his hearth, and slowly carves, with great effort 
and unsatisfactory tools, a pair of miserable shoes” (CCS 111 [GA I/7:72]). 
Also, this would be a society where there can be neither wage laborers, nor 
much time for leisure. At the same time, however, Fichte wants his account of 
property rights to have a broader appeal and applicability. As we have seen, 
this account is based on an understanding of the general nature of the claims 
of freedom that persons make in any society. More precisely, this account does 
not simply consist of a portrayal of the determinate property rights of the 
members of a particular, historically conditioned society; rather, it is con-
cerned with the conditions for the continued existence of personhood and 
free efficacy in the sensible world generally. It is also essential to keep in mind 
that for Fichte, no regime of right is immune to the possibility of injustice, 
and that it is always possible “for several persons to unite against one or against 
several weaker ones in order to oppress them with their common power” 
(FNR 137 [GA I/4:436]).13 It is no accident, then, that Fichte casts persons’ 
“right of coercion” against others—that is, their right to defend their claim to 
a sphere of freedom—as an “absolute” right, that is, a right that is never 
entirely given up in any society.
But wouldn’t the constant presence of the right of coercion of persons make 
impossible the formation of stable, peaceful regimes of property rights, with-
out the coercive intervention of an omnipotent state, as some commentators 
have claimed? I think not. Fichte’s answer to this question can be found in the 
passage where he describes this right as absolute, to which I now turn.
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 The Absolute Right of Coercion
Fichte refers to the absolute right of coercion of persons in the context of 
describing the nature of the complaint that a person would have about a 
regime of property rights which did not ensure his or her continued existence. 
Let us now look at this passage more closely:
All property rights are grounded in the contract of all with all, which states: “We 
are all entitled to keep this, on the condition that we let you have what is yours.” 
Therefore, if someone is unable to make a living from his labor, he has not been 
given what is absolutely his, and therefore the contract is completely canceled 
with respect to him, and from that moment on he is no longer obligated by 
right to recognize anyone else’s property. Now in order to prevent property 
rights from being destabilized in this way, all the others must (as a matter of 
right and as a result of the civil contract) relinquish a portion of their own prop-
erty, until he is able to live. … The executive power is as responsible for such 
repartitioning as it is for all the other branches of government, and the poor 
(those of course who have entered the civil contract) have an absolute right of 
coercion to such assistance. (FNR 186 [GA I/4:22–23])
Fichte is not talking here about an ordinary legal procedure that is under-
taken to compensate for the violation of an already specified and recognized 
property right of a person; rather, he is addressing the possibility of redesign-
ing an entire regime of rights. This possibility is raised and demanded by 
individuals or groups who cannot make a living under the existing regime, 
that is, by the poor, since the regime in place has failed to grant them the 
liberties that they require in order to provide for their own continued exis-
tence. So this regime has failed to properly implement the basic principle of 
all sustainable social contracts concerning property rights, namely: “We are all 
entitled to keep this, on the condition that we let you have what is yours.” 
Fichte thus implies that this situation can be construed as a failure on the part 
of the state: not only has the state failed to meet the needs of some of its mem-
bers to provide for their continued existence; it has also failed to bring the 
condition of these individuals to the attention of the rest of the society. So it 
is the poor who, by invoking their “absolute right of coercion,” request a 
“repartitioning” of property rights in society.
Note also that by recognizing the absolute right of coercion of the poor, 
Fichte also concedes that these individuals have a right to use force against the 
beneficiaries of the existing regime of property rights—for example, to take 
their property and positions by force, which of course would destabilize the 
entire regime. Yet the poor’s application of the right of coercion in this way 
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could be conducive to the formation of a stable, commonly acceptable regime 
of rights only if they take what is rightfully and “absolutely” theirs. Once a 
society is destabilized, however, there can be no guarantee that they will 
indeed be able to secure what is their due. So they stand to gain more by 
merely invoking their defensive right of coercion to assistance. The beneficia-
ries of the current regime of property rights also have more to lose than to gain 
from social instability. Fichte thus argues that instead of responding by force 
to the call of the poor for the repartitioning of property rights, the beneficia-
ries of the current regime should “yield in their claim” to their current privi-
leges. Fichte thus supposes that once the parties realize the potential dangers 
of civil conflict, they will see that the safest and most sustainable way of solv-
ing the problem of injustice in society is the collective and peaceful redefini-
tion of the terms of their social contract on private property. And I take this 
supposition to be the key to understanding why Fichte believes that coercion, 
or the possibility thereof, can be conductive to the formation of a commonly 
acceptable regime of property rights that can obligate all.
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